According to the statement, throughout the talks in Bangkok, developed countries had averted their interests away from the KP and instead shed favourable light on forming a new agreement which would set new national targets, rather than the international legally-binding targets of the KP. This new attitude is dangerous, especially at this crucial time where the growing threat of a devastating global crisis urges the need for intensified action against climate change; this concern, the following statement addresses:
" The replacement of the KP with such a loose internation arrangement will result in the drastic downgrading of international disciplines over developed countries in their emission reduction targets and efforts." (G-77, 2009).
To avoid such leniency in developed countries, the G-77 and China demand that the developed countries in the KP enter the 2nd commitment period in 2013 (the 1st commitment of the KP ends in 2012) as legally obliged to, and pledge to deepen emission cuts, collectively and individually, while the US (not part of the KP) should also make such commitments. This would ensure the necessary action against climate change from the developed countries, and the G-77 and China voice that it is also expected and demanded by the world public.
The solution the G-77 and China presented in their statement is one of regulatory control, as it demands the developed countries of the KP to specific figures of emission cuts. An alternative would be an economic incentive, a process of control which would motivate the developed countries towards a course of action. An economic incentive suitable for this case would be the application of marketable pollution permits. Instead of the developed countries establishing solid figures of emission cuts, the total emissions goal of all the countries together would be the only figure in consideration. Permits would be distributed to the developed countries in the KP, and the countries would freely trade permits amongst themselves. As long as the total emissions goal is sufficient, and the each country obtains the appropriate number of permits in accordance to their individual emissions by the specified goal time, this process would be effective in preventing the consequences of climate change we would otherwise face.
However, such an ideal outcome is not realistic. As this is a critical case on an international level, we cannot risk the uncertainty of marketable pollution permits, especially since it would be ineffective in comparison to the stricter policies of the 2nd commitment of the KP as proposed. The economic incentive allows for complications and leniency. There would be conflict in the establishment of a single emissions goal, as some countries are greater emitters than others. The trading of permits would cause problems, since it could be done irrationally, or based on economic or political - not environmental - agendas. In comparison, the regulatory control as proposed by the G-77 and China includes a collective goal for all the countries as well as the individual goals for each country. It is legally-binding internationally, and therefore leaves less room for lax commitment from all the countries.
The G-77 began as a coalition of 77 countries, but expanded to include 130 developing nations. It was established for the very purpose of giving leverage to those nations in the United Nations. As developing nations, they must support their own developing economy; they do not have the wealth and the means to take significant action against climate change, yet they are the ones who suffer from the consequences of climate change brought on mostly by the developed world. In the press statement, they ask the developed countries to not abandon the KP, enter the 2nd commitment of the KP as legally obliged to, and possibly prevent the world from suffering a global crisis; it’s their plea to the developed countries to take responsibility.
References
G-77. “Group of 77 and China press statement on the imperative of the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol as a key component of the Copenhagen outcome.” Third World Network. 9 October 2009. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2009/20091003/G77_press_statement_9.pdf.
“About the Group of 77.” The Group of 77. 2008. http://www.g77.org/doc/.
Sharon,
ReplyDeleteI really enjoyed this post. I espectailly found the flaws in the econmic insentives that you pointed out to be interesting. I agree with your criticism towards this approach, it allows for too much leniency, and as a planet we are now past the point of being able to take the easy way out.
I might not be understanding your post correctly, but it seems to me that no matter how carbon permits are divided up, the net decrease in emissions will be the same. Of course, whether or not the distribution chosen by the market is fair, however, is another question entirely.
ReplyDeleteI think that the only way to ensure that the G-77 works fairly and provides equal treatment is using the KP method. If countries are allowed to "roam free" and trade their pollution permits around with no sense of control, there is bound to be some error. Where the KP is effective is in treating each country individually and also looking at the big picture, that being the effect of all the countries combined.
ReplyDeleteThis sort of attitude is not the right way to fight climate change. In order to seriously cut global emissions then there needs to be a global deal. There has been much criticism of the Kyoto Protocol but I believe it is a step in the right direction in the sense that it obligates countries globally to cut their emissions together. If other countries like China, being the largest emitter of green house gases, will strive away from a global deal then nothing will be accomplished. There needs to be global unity in order to yield significant effects.
ReplyDelete